Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning (2025)

INTRODUCTIONSome years ago, a group from several intelligence agencies was discussing the question of indications analysis and strategic warning. Reminded by an individual present that analysts who used indications methodology had correctly forecast both the North Korean attack on South Korea in 1950 and the Chinese intervention, a relative newcomer to the intelligence business said, “Yes, but you couldn't have done a very good job, because no one believed you.’’ This bit of unintentional humor aptly describes much of the problem of warning intelligence. Why is it that “no one’’—a slight but not great exaggeration—believes in the indications method, despite its demonstrably good record in these and other crises which have threatened our security interests? Can the reluctance to believe be in part from the lack of understanding of the nature of indications analysis or the lack of experience with “real’’ warning problems?This work was originally written in the early 1970s as a classified textbook for intelligence analysts and their supervisors and for use in intelligence courses. It was the product of some twenty-five years experience with indications and warning intelligence from the analytic standpoint. So far as I know, it was the first and perhaps still the only effort by an intelligence analyst to bring together a body of experience on the warning problem and to set forth some guidelines to assist analysts and others involved in the warning process. The examples used in the text were drawn largely from World War II and the Cold War.Within little more than the past decade, major and dramatic developments have significantly altered the nature of the warning problem. The first was the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, the areas that had been the primary focus of collection and indications analysis for over forty years. The second was the emergence of terrorism—dramatically brought home on 11 September 2001—as a major, if not the major threat to our security. Obviously, these great developments have significantly altered the targets of collection and focus of analysis in the Intelligence Community.Table of ContentsForewordEditor’s PrefaceIntroductionChapter 1. The Role of Warning IntelligenceGeneral Nature of the ProblemWhat Is Warning?Intentions versus CapabilitiesChapter 2. Introduction to the Analytical MethodIndicator Lists: Compiling IndicationsFundamentals of Indications AnalysisSpecifics of the Analytical MethodChapter 3. Military Indications and WarningThe Nature of Military IndicatorsOrder-of-Battle Analysis in Crisis SituationsLogistics is the Queen of BattlesOther Factors in Combat PreparationsChapter 4. Political Factors for WarningAmbiguity of Political IndicatorsA Problem of PerceptionConsiderations in Political WarningChapter 5. Warning from the Totality of EvidenceThe Relative Weight of Political and Military FactorsIsolating the Critical Facts and IndicationsSome Guidelines for Assessing the Meaning of EvidenceReconstructing the Adversary's Decisionmaking ProcessChapter 6. Surprise and TimingPrincipal Factors in Timing and SurpriseExamples of Assessing TimingWarning is Not a Forecast of ImminenceChapter 7. The Problem of DeceptionInfrequency and Neglect of DeceptionPrinciples, Techniques and Effectiveness of DeceptionTypes of DeceptionWhat Can We Do About It?Chapter 8. Judgments and PolicyFacts Don't “Speak For Themselves’’What Do Top Consumers Need, and Want, to Know?Intelligence in Support of Policy?Assessing Probabilities Read more